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ABSTRACT

Online Social Networks have completely transformed communication in the
world of social networks. Participation in online social networks have been growing
significantly and is expected to continue to grow in the upcoming years. As user
participation in online social media is on the rise, so is the concern pertaining to
user privacy and information security; users want to interact on social media without
jeopardizing their privacy and personal information. Extensive research has been
conducted in the area of developing privacy-preserving protocols to allow users to
interact in a secure and privacy-preserving environment. One of the elements that
social media have is the feature or ability to befriend other users. While a user may
manually search for friends to “add”, social media networks like Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, Snapchat and others facilitate friend recommendations to their users based
on di↵erent criteria. We examine and compare the advantages and disadvantages of
existing privacy-preserving techniques and schemes. We also analyze di↵erent models
used to implement friend recommendation protocols and study proximity measurement metrics used in existing works. This thesis scrutinizes the security weaknesses
and vulnerabilities of three Friend Recommendation Protocols from existing work
and develop a corresponding solution. We propose a (F SF R) protocol that is based
on Shamir’s Secret Sharing to facilitate friend recommendations in Online Social
Networks in a fast, secure and private manner. After comparing our protocol with
existing protocols in terms of security, computation efficiency, costs, flexibility and
more, we conclude that our F SF R protocol guarantees a superior and more efficient
friend recommendation protocol.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND
According to [1],it is estimated that the number of users who are on any form
of social media was recorded to have reached 4.2 billion as of January 2021; the most
popular social network was revealed to be Facebook with a total of about 2.74 billion
user accounts. Social Media allows for users who can be at di↵erent locations to
interact with one another. With such a large number of users utilizing Online Social
Networks, there is an abundance of personal information and data that needs to be
protected and kept private. Users can keep personal information such as passwords,
private messages, phone numbers, email addresses and shared content private by
not publicizing it on the network. For instance, on Twitter, users have the option
to limit who may view the content they post by selecting “Protect my Tweets”.
Likewise, if one does not wish to be discovered by other users, they have the ability
to control their discoverability settings and manage contacts imported. Users can
decide whether they would like for people who have their email address or phone
number to find them or not; they also have the ability to limit location information
mined by Twitter through unchecking the feature in the settings. Twitter also o↵ers
the feature of allowing users to choose if they would allow Twitter to keep track of the
sites they visit that incorporate Twitter content such as embedded timelines. Thus,
users have some control over the content they would like to keep private. However,
while users are o↵ered the option to protect certain information, the majority of the
data users provide, even unintentionally, could jeopardize their privacy.
Social media supplies an overwhelming amount of data feeds that are extracted
and utilized to be used for di↵erent purposes such as marketing [2]. This results in a
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large amount of information exposure of casual social media users. Records of users
such as their identities, friend lists, likes and comments are centrally stored in Social
Data Generation [3].
Several questions are brought up in [4,5] that challenge the credibility of Online
Social Networks (OSN). Questions are raised pertaining to what pieces of information
exactly are supplied by users to the OSNs. Concerns are also raised regarding the default privacy settings for the framework of the social network. It is important to note
that OSNPs like Twitter and Facebook are needed to allow social networks to function
as these network providers provide the functionalities to the users. Consequently, a
framework that utilizes a central network provider but implements privacy-preserving
techniques to ensure user privacy is required.
In general, many online social networks collect sensitive user profile data and
store the data after having them encrypted on their server. Essentially, users have
no control over what the OSNP chooses to do with the data. OSNs are free to share
this stored data with third parties for business purposes [6]. Moreover, sensitive
information may be obtained through unauthorized methods like hacking. In April
2021, Facebook was met with a surge of individuals threatening legal action after
they decided to not notify more than 530 million users from across 106 countries
of a breach that resulted in their personal information being exposed. The leaked
personal data was obtained through hacking and included phone numbers, locations,
full names, and email addresses [5].

1.2. CONTRIBUTION
This thesis focuses on friend recommendations in online social networks and
proposes a protocol, F SF R (Fast and Secure Friend Recommendation), that allows to
carry out the friend recommendation process in a more efficient, secure and privacy-
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preserving manner than the existing protocols. We propose two F SF R solutions,
F SF R1 and F SF R2 with the latter being a more secure implementation of the
former. While we utilize Shamir’s Secret Sharing in both of our solutions, F SF R2
utilizes a combination of Shamir’s Secret Sharing with Paillier’s encryption.
Our protocol utilizes a Federated Cloud Model by requiring for the utilization
of more than one cloud server to communicate with the OSNP in order to facilitate the
friend recommendation. When implementing the PAFR protocol [6], the computation
time of the cloud server was negligible as it was used primarily as a storage medium as
opposed to being utilized in the computation process. However, this placed additional
responsibility and burden on the OSNP as it left all the expensive computations such
as decryption to the OSNP. The presence of a single cloud contributed to the OSNP’s
comparatively high computation time.
Our F SF R protocol will reduce this excess computation time by utilizing an
additional cloud server. By adopting a federated cloud environment, we introduce a
framework based on the collaboration of multiple public cloud environments. Thus,
the OSNP can be spared of some of it’s responsibilities by allowing the additional
cloud server to perform some of the computations. By adopting a federated cloud environment, the responsibilities will now be distributed across three parties as opposed
to only two parties.
The F SF R protocol is expected to maintain the following:
• Security: the proposed protocol utilizes Shamir’s Secret Sharing to prevent any
single party from having access to user’s information or the entire data of any
single user. It also utilizes permutations and randomization to ensure higher
security. More information on the security of our protocol will be discussed in
Section 5.
• Efficiency: the proposed protocol does not encrypt the entire matrix of each
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user; rather, we split the data. This is more efficient and less expensive. For
our second solution, we utilize Paillier’s encryption; however, we limit the encryption to only encrypting the random values instead of encrypting the whole
matrix which would have been expensive. A comparative analysis on the efficiency of our protocol in comparison to other existing protocols can be seen in
Section 6.
• User convenience: the protocol does not require users to be online throughout
the friend recommendation process.
• Distributed Computation: As discussed earlier, utilizing a collaboration between the OSNP and federated cloud environment will allow for computation
time to be significantly less while allowing for the computations to be distributed
fairly equally.
The remaining sections are organized as follows; Section 2 discusses related works,
Section 3 explains the preliminaries, Section 4 explains the framework of our protocol,
Section 5 goes into depth explaining both of the solutions of our F SF R protocol and
their corresponding steps, Section 6 evaluates the performance of the protocol while
comparing it to existing protocols, and finally, we conclude with future recommendations.
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2. RELATED WORKS

There are several existing works in the field of privacy-preservation. This encompasses studies related to privacy-preserving techniques, decentralized vs centralized architectures, models, frameworks, and actual protocols to implement the friend
recommendation process. We analyzed these topics while studying their advantages
and disadvantages. We refer to three friend recommendation protocols for analysis
and examine the strengths and weaknesses of each of them while identifying security weaknesses that we sought to eliminate. The first protocol, Privacy-Preserving
Friend Recommendation with Homomorphic Encryption (P P F Rh ) [7] is founded on
the homomorphic encryption scheme which utilizes a universal hash function. The
second protocol, Privacy-Preserving Friend Recommendation with Source Privacy
(P P F Rsp ) [7] utilizes the concept of protecting source privacy through anonymous
message routing using secret sharing while the third protocol, Privacy-Aware Friend
Recommendation (P AF R) [6], proposes a framework that utilizes the concept of
outsourcing encrypted profiles to a cloud environment in a privacy-aware manner
approaching it by utilizing Paillier’s encryption as well as AES encryption. All three
protocols utilize the common neighbors approach for the proximity measure in the
friend recommendation process.

2.1. PRIVACY PRESERVING FRIEND RECOMMENDATION
This section discusses the implementation of the two Privacy-Preserving Friend
Recommendation Protocols and provide a comparison between the two.

2.1.1. P P F Rh . - The first protocol which utilizes homomorphic encryption
is P P F Rh . The fundamental procedures associated with P P F Rh is to first encrypt
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the ID of each friend independently and perform a homomorphic addition on the
encrypted data. Each user generates an encrypted matrix that contains his/her friend
list information and forwards it to target user A. Then, A aggregates the encrypted
friend lists component-wise to get the encrypted frequency for each potential friend.
The first column entry contains an actual user ID while the row stores the hashed
value of the user ID. After this, with the help of the third party who holds the private
key pk, A securely retrieves the IDs of users whose frequency is greater than or equal
to the threshold. One of the biggest limitations of the P P F Rh protocol is that there
is no o↵-line support. The recommendation process can be carried out only when all
parties involved are online. Also, the protocol leaks the common neighbor score to a
third part violating the privacy of all the users involved.
2.1.2. P P F Rsp . The next protocol is the (P P F Rsp ) protocol. Alkanhal et
al. [7] discusses the protocol as the following; they denote the user waiting for friend
recommendations as A, the friend of A as B, and a single friend of B (potential friend
candidate to A) as Cij in the subset of C (all of B’s friends). In this protocol, it
is assumed that each user in the network generates a public-private key pair using
the RSA public key system. Each Cij uses an AES encryption algorithm to encrypt
his/her data. The secret key is divided into a number of individual shares; the
maximum number of shares is the number of friends in the friend list of Cij . This
results in requiring a number of minimum shares to be reconstructed in order to obtain
the key. The main idea of the P P F Rsp protocol is to allow C to introduce themselves
to A in manner that preserves the privacy of the source, or user seeking the friend
recommendation; this is done through anonymous communication. This method is
similar to the Onion Routing method. Here, A waits for the self introductions to
come. B, which is the intermediate user between A and Cij , arranges a random path
along which Cij will pass the self introduction to A. The random path can hide the
identities of all Cij in the subset of C by preventing A from tracking back to them.
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Once again, the goal of this protocol is founded on allowing for C to make friends
and pass introductions to A to without disclosing who they are sending introductions
to. This preserves the privacy of both A and B. Moreover, as User A cannot trace
back to Cij , the privacy of all Cij in C is preserved. However, although none of the
parties involved can be identified, users who have a common neighbor score greater
than the threshold are revealed. These are users who are likely to be recommended
as friends to the target user.

2.2. PAFR
In [6], the authors discuss the Privacy-Aware Friend Recommendation protocol
(PAFR) framework which allows users to outsource their encrypted profile data to a
cloud environment. The framework utilizes a hybrid encryption approach which is a
combination of homomorphic encryption scheme with Paillier’s encryption and AES.
This protocol utilizes a decentralized architecture and involves three components:
the user, a cloud, and an OSNP. The user’s role is to encrypt his/her profile data
and outsource it in it’s encrypted form to the cloud which stores and manages all of
the encrypted profile data. The cloud is also the entity that will be communicating
with the OSNP when facilitating the friend recommendation process. The OSNP
will create as well as share the cryptographic keys with users. The P AF R protocol
is divided into two stages; Secure Outsourcing Profile Data and Secure Collaborative
Friend Recommendation (SCFR). The Outsourcing stage defines what is needed to
be done before sending the profile data to the cloud. The SCFR stage defines the
communication phase and explains the collaboration between the cloud and OSNP.
Zhou et al. [8] discuss the homomorphic encryption scheme on Integer Vectors.
They discuss some implementations of computation tasks such as feature extraction
and data aggregation. Upon discussing the features, they agree that while it is dif-
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ficult to develop universal homomorphic encryption-schemes due to it’s computation
and communication costs, homomorphic-encryption schemes may be able to be developed for specific applications. Homomorphic encryption di↵ers from general encryption methods by having the ability to perform computations directly onto encrypted
data without accessing the data itself. The scheme supports both “addition” and
“multiplication” operations on encrypted data. Thus, when using the homomorphic
encryption scheme, addition and multiplication operations can be performed on a
cipher-text rather than accessing the actual plain-text. This is significant and advantageous as it prevents any encounter with the actual data eliminating the possibility
of tampering with the data that is meant to be protected during the computation
process.
The paper also raises the question aimed to reduce costs of computations and
overall communication time involved with homomorphic encryption operations. In
order to reduce computation time, we propose a protocol that initiates a collaboration
between a federated cloud model and OSNP utilizing Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme.
The scheme, like homomorphic encryption, allows for addition and multiplication
operation to be performed on data; however, in contrast to the computations being
performed on encrypted data, it is performed on secret shares.

2.3. PRIVACY-PRESERVING MODEL
Samanthula et al. [7] discusses models used to implement Privacy-Preserving
Friend Recommendation protocols. The authors refer to existing work and reference a
study by Machanavajjhala et al. [9] who mentions of a trade-o↵ between accuracy and
privacy when implementing private friend recommendation using di↵erential privacy.
The model adopted in their work, however, had some limitations; namely, choosing to
maintain accuracy at the expense of privacy and vice versa. The authors [7] propose
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a superior model called Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). The SMC Model is
able to maintain better accuracy while preserving the privacy of all users involved.
(SMC)

2.4. CONTENT-BASED AND TOPOLOGY-BASED ALGORITHMS
There are two ways algorithms can be implemented to recommend new friends
to a user. One of the algorithms is content-based while the other is topology-based.
Friend recommendation algorithms can also utilize a combination of both contentbased and topology-based algorithms.
Yu et al. [10] introduces a framework to allow friend recommendation based
on similarities between user contents. This algorithm utilizes users’ content as the
basis to decide whether to recommend a user by considering users’ profile information
such as interests, education and age. The framework enables friend recommendations
by analyzing the extracted information from user’s profile pages. The protocol will be
able to generate the frequency of keywords and measures the frequency of each word.
This is used to compare with other users who also undergo the same analysis with
their profile pages. Users with the highest level of proximity, or matching keywords,
will be recommended to each other [10]. Thus, the likelihood of A being recommended
to B depends on the similarity between their profiles. Alkanhal et al. [6] discusses the
second option which is based on a topology-based friend recommendation framework.
This framework focuses on the topological structures of social networks and how users
are interconnected on the network. Through topology-based friend recommendation
protocols, the friend recommendation process is implemented by recommending new
friends to a user from a set of their friends’ friends. More details on this framework
can be studied in Section 4.
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2.5. NETWORK ARCHITECTURES
Nilizadeh et al. [11] discusses a decentralized architecture known as Cachet
which uses a combination of hash tables and attribute based encryption to protect
confidentiality, integrity and availability of user content. It also preserves the privacy
of user relationships through a decentralized architecture that involves no network
provider; all communications happen directly between users. Cutillo [14] explains
that while privacy exposures can be eliminated through creating more secure protocols
and frameworks to work with the OSN, the risk of user’s privacy is inevitable due to
the central storage aspect of centralized architectures. Thus, they opt for a Peer-topeer architecture as an alternative to the centralized framework.
In contrast, Samanthula et al. [7] opts for a centralized architecture which
allows for users’ data to be encrypted and stored on the server of an OSN. The paper focuses on an OSN framework where the data resides on the OSN as opposed
to Cachet which has no central network provider. The paper [7] argues that decentralization would force users to choose between availability, convenience or reliability
through forcing them to store data on their own systems. If not that, users will be
forced to store data on network providers that they do not know or would have no
more trust in than they would in a centralized network provider. In the case where
users choose to store their data on a separate network provider, they might as well
have a central network provider. The solution [7] opts for a centralized network and
assumes that users can encrypt their profile data before sending it to be stored on
the OSN’s server. However, despite the encryption of users’ profile data, concerns
are raised regarding how trustworthy the provider actually is. As discussed earlier,
we need to rely on network providers as the losses when moving to a decentralized
structure would outweigh the benefits. This creates the incentive to develop protocols
that guarantee efficiency and privacy.
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2.6. FRIENTEGRITY
To address this, Feldman et al. [12] develops a framework called Frientegrity;
under this framework, the service provider sees only the encrypted data and cannot
carry out any operation that is not expected of it without it being detected. However,
Samanthula et al. [6] argues that while the integrity and privacy of the contents of
a user is protected, this model still allows for the relationship between two users to
be revealed to the service provider. The authors [6] develop a solution to counter
this information leakage by creating a protocol that does not reveal the friendship
between any two users to the service provider. Another weakness of the Frientegrity
model is that target user A can search through his/her friends access control list to
search for new friends. The paper [6] identifies this as a violation of user privacy as it
allows for the friend lists of target user A’s friends to be revealed to A and proposes a
solution for that. In their solution, the friend list of a user is never revealed to other
users. However, although the protocol allows for the content of the users’ friend lists
to be kept private, it allows for the possibility of the permuted friend lists to be leaked
to the OSNP.
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3. PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we present some concepts and notations that will be used in
the proposed solution.

3.1. UNIVERSAL HASH FUNCTION
Hashing is a method used to convert a range of key values (using modulo
operator) into a range of array indexes. The goal of hashing is to map the elements
of a domain into a smaller domain. For instance, consider a set of integers in domain
L = {0,1,..,l-1}. Through hashing, we map these integers into a smaller domain we
denote as V = {0,1,..,s-1} where s < l with minimum number of collisions. A hash
function is defined as below:

hab (k) = ((ak + b)

mod p)

mod N

(3.1)

In the hash function equation above, p is a prime number

1 while a and b are

random values.
3.1.1. Hash Table. A hash table, also known as a hash map, is a data
structure that maps keys to values. It is used to store an index into an array of
buckets or slots from which the desired value can be found. The index, or hash code,
is computed by using the hash function. For our protocol, we utilize a hash table to
store the user’s information (ID and friend lists). An example is provided below. We
denote the following:
• X as the set of all possible keys (k).
• Table T as the Hash Table with S positions. These positions or slots will contain
the hash value.

13
F requently U sed N otations
P P F Rh
P P F Rsp
P AF R
F SF R1
F SF R2
C1
C2
OSN P
⇡1
⇡2

Privacy-preserving Friend Recommendation with Homomorphic Encryption
Privacy-preserving Friend Recommendation with Source Privacy
Privacy-Aware Friend Recommendation
Fast and Secure Friend Recommendation Solution1
Fast and Secure Friend Recommendation Solution2
Cloud1
Cloud2
Online Social Network Provider
C1 ’s and C2 ’s random permutation function
OSN P ’s random permutation function
Table 3.1: Frequently Used Notations

• Hash function h(k): The function maps X to {0,1,..,S 1}. In this step, function
h(k) will map any key (k) to one of the slots in table T . After the mapping is
complete, We use h(k) to refer to the location in T where the key is stored.
Suppose we want to map 4 user IDs to a hash table. Let us define the hash
function as: the (sum of the digits in ID mod 10). In this example, the user IDs are
our key values. We will map these keys to indexes in our array. The user IDs are:
• 7250903661
• 7302383966
• 7754321661
• 2740487840
For each entry, h(k) = (sum of id digits mod 10) is computed. An example is
shown below using the first entry ID: 9014638161.

h(k) = (7+2+5+0+9+0+3+6+6+1 mod 10) = (39 mod 10) = 9
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Element

Key(k)

Sum of digits

Hash Value h(k)

1
2
3
4

7250903661
7302383966
7754321661
2740487840

39
48
42
44

9
8
2
4

Table 3.2: Mapping User IDs to Hash Table

As reflected in the table, each of the keys or User IDs are mapped to a specific
index in the hash table. The index serves as a reference to the key value.
3.1.2. Hash vs Encryption. Hashing and encryption are two separate cryptographic processes that utilizes an algorithm and key, Encryption allows to convert
plaintext data into something indecipherable. You can, however, decrypt the data by
using a corresponding cryptographic key. On the other hand, once data is hashed, it
cannot be restored to its original format as it is a one-way process.

3.2. COMMON NEIGHBOR SCORE
As discussed in the Section 2, the common neighbor proximity states that
two strangers who have a friend in common are more likely to be introduced to
each other than those who do not have any friends in common. The algorithm
contains a threshold that allows only users with scores more than or equal to t to
be recommended as friends to A. When computing the common neighbors score,
it is important to note that only nodes that are two-hop neighboring nodes [6] are
considered. This means that only nodes that are two nodes apart from the user is
considered. Thus, if we would like to recommend A new potential friends, we will
only take account of the users who are two nodes away from it.The function below
represents how the Common Neighbors Score is calculated.
S(x, y) = |N (x) \ N (y)|
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In the function, N (x) denotes the set of adjacent nodes to node x while N (y)
denotes the set of adjacent nodes to node y. The intersection element of Set theory
(\) is used to indicate the intersection or common adjacent nodes identified by implementing the formula. The common nodes or intersecting nodes will be candidates
that can be recommended to the target user. A common neighbor score of 0 would
indicate that the users are not close and will thus not be recommended. The higher
the score is, the higher the likelihood is for a friend recommendation to be made.
More details on the Common Neighbors Approach can be found in the upcoming
Section.

3.3. SHAMIR’S SECRET SHARING SCHEME
Shamir’s Secret Sharing is a scheme that enables a private crypto key to be
split into separate pieces, or shards, rendering each shard useless unless enough are
assembled to reconstruct the original key. Shamir’s Secret Sharing allows participants
to share ownership of a secret by distributing shares; consequently, it prevents any
single party from having sole ownership over the data. In order to gain access to
the original secret, a minimum number of shares must be combined together; this
is known as the threshold denoted as t. This scheme splits a secret S into n parts
known as shares, such that with any k of n pieces (that satisfies the requirement
of t), one can reconstruct the original secret. However, with any k

1 pieces, no

information is exposed about S and the secret will not be able to be reconstructed.
That is generally called a (n, k) threshold scheme [13].

3.4. RANDOM PERMUTATION
A permutation refers to an arrangement of elements. The number of permutations of n distinct objects is n!, which is the product of all positive integers less
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than or equal to n. So for 3 distinct objects, there are 6 total possible permutations
as 3! = 6
A random permutation is a permutation containing a fixed number of a random selection from a given set of elements. Permutation functions are used to
strengthen the security of the user’s data and to prevent data leakage. When implementing the friend recommendation process, the incorporating on random permutation functions prevents the unauthorized party from knowing which piece of data
corresponds to which user in order to guarantee the privacy of the user’s data. More
details on the utilizing of random permutation functions can be seen in Section 5.
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4. PROTOCOL FRAMEWORK

This section will discuss the framework of our protocol; it will elaborate on
the model used, parties involved, metrics and algorithms used, privacy-preserving
technique adopted as well as explain the justifications.

4.1. PROTOCOL MODEL
Our Protocol utilizes a centralized three party model consisting of two cloud
servers (C1 , C2 ) and an Online Social Network Provider (OSNP). Through communication between C1 ,C2 , and the OSNP, friend recommendations can be implemented
in a privacy-preserving manner. The basic role of each of the parties is as follows:
• User: Each user’s information will be stored in a matrix after being hashed.
This is the only intervention the user will have in the friend recommendation
process implemented by the F SF R Protocol. Once the matrix is created, it is
now ready to be split into shares. Each of the three parties of the model will
be receiving a single share.
• C1 and C2 : Once the shares are received by each of the parties, all the computations will take place via the federated cloud environment and the OSNP.
Communications between all parties are secure and privacy-preserving.
• OSNP: The OSNP has the responsibility for providing the functionality to the
user. The OSNP will perform computations on the shares it receives from
the cloud servers. Moreover, the OSNP has a crucial role in the final steps
of implementing the protocol when utilizing Paillier’s Encryption. A detailed
breakdown can be seen in Section 5.
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4.2. TOPOLOGY-BASED ALGORITHM,
For our protocol, we adopt the topology-based algorithm which means that
our protocol will rely on the topological structures of social networks and how users
are interconnected on the network. The topological approach identifies existing links
among users on a network in order to facilitate new ones. The proximity metric used
in our topology based protocol is the Common Neighbors Score.

4.3. COMMON NEIGHBORS SCORE
One of the most notable metrics used to measure the proximity between any
two users is obtaining their Common Neighbors score. Topology-based friend recommendation protocols are based on the Common Neighbors measure. This proximity
measure provides a means to recommend friends to users in a privacy-preserving manner. In simple terms, this measure states that the closer one user is to another, the
more likely they are to be recommended as a potential friend to them. The common
neighbor approach also states that two strangers who have a friend in common are
more likely to be introduced to each other than those who do not have any friends in
common. If user A and a potential friend candidate, user B, have a common neighbors score of 10 and a threshold of 8, user A and B have a higher chance of being
recommended to each other.
The figure below represent a sample toplogical network with a total of 9 users.
Each user on this network has at least one friend while some users have multiple
friends. Some of the users have common friends with other users. As mentioned
in Section 2, the Common Neighbors Score can be computed by only considering
two-hop neighboring nodes or nodes that are only two nodes apart from the target
user.
We take User B as our target user that we would like to make friend recom-
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Figure 4.1: A sample topological network

mendations for.
The table shows how the Common Neighbors Score is found. We take each
node x in the network and put in into the function N (x). The function will note
all the nodes adjacent to the specified node. We denote y as the target user; in this
example, we seek to make friend recommendations for Node B. Thus, N (y) lists
the adjacent nodes of Node B. We will use this to compare it to other users on the
network. We assume that no new friendships are being made or broken during the
period of computing the Common Neighbors Score. Finally, the final column reflects
the number of common nodes found between each x node and target user B. For
node C and node H, note that a null value was stored. This is due to the fact that
Node B already maintains a friendship with both nodes. Friend Recommendation
are only to be applied to users who are not existing friends. If the friendship is to be
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(x)

N (x)

N (y)

S(x, y)

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

E, D
H, C
B,D,G
A,C,E,G
A,D
I
H,C,D
B,G
F

H,C
H, C
H,C
H,C
H,C
H,C
H,C
H,C
H,C

0
N/A
null
1
0
0
2
null
0

Table 4.1: Common Neighbor Score Computations

broken, a new common neighbor score may be calculated.

4.4. SHAMIR’S SECRET SHARING
We use Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme in implementing our protocol. As
briefly discussed in the Preliminaries, Shamir’s Secret Sharing prevents a single party
from having full authority over a secret by distributing shares among a number of
users such that with any k of n pieces, the original secret can be reconstructed.
For instance, if S has been split into 7 shards and the scheme chooses t = 4,
only 4/7 of the shards are required to reconstruct the original secret and the holders
of any 4 shards can combine their shards for access. Any less number of shards will
not allow access. Thus, if only 3/7 of the shards are combined, S will not be able to
be reconstructed.
4.4.1. Multiplication and Addition. Multiplication and addition are two
forms of computations that could be implemented on shares under Shamir’s Secret
Sharing Scheme. The basis of these computations rely on them being performed on
split data, known as shares.
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Addition. An example of the implementation of addition under the scheme
is shown below. Suppose we have two secret messages, 5 and 8. Let us denote P0
for 5 and P1 for 8. Under Shamir’s Secret Sharing, we split both of the values into
shares. We split P0 into A0 and A1 and do the same to P1 as shown below
P0 = 5

P1 = 8

a0 = 3

b0 = 9

a1 = 2

b1 = -1

As shown in the table above, Alice and Bob both have two split shares instead
of their single original message. Now, Alice and Bob can send one of their own shares
to each other, although this is not required. Alice and Bob own the shares as shown
below:
P0

P1

a0 = 3

a1 = 2

b0 = 9

b1 = -1

Alice and Bob can do addition computations locally. The calculations expand
to look like the equation below:

a + b = (a0 + a1 ) + (b0 + b1 )

(4.1)

We can easily rearrange the order of the values into

a + b = (a0 + b0 ) + (a1 + b1 )

(4.2)

P0 will compute (a0 + b0 ) using the shares it owns while P1 will solve (a1 + b1 )
using the shares it owns. Thus, by the end of the computation, P0 will have only
received one share from b while P1 only gets one share of a. All computations are
performed locally with no interactions between the parties after the initial exchange
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of shares. Most of the computations of our F SF R protocol require only additive
computations; however, some may require more complex operations such as multiplication to be implemented.

Multiplication. While doing additive computations are fairly simple, multiplicative computations are more complex because it requires for the parties to communicate during the computation. When applying multiplication to the shares, the
formula is expanded as shown below:

a ⇤ b = (a0 + a1 )(b0 + b1 ) = (a0 ⇤ b0 ) + (a0 ⇤ b1 ) + (a1 ⇤ b0 ) + (a1 ⇤ b1 )

(4.3)

In the expanded formula above, (a0 ⇤ b0 ) can be computed by P0 locally while
P1 can compute (a1 ⇤ b1 ) in the same manner. However, an obstacle is encountered
upon trying to compute (a0 ⇤ b1 ) + (a1 ⇤ b0 ). Neither party has both of the shares
it is being asked to compute. In order to execute this computation, the party that
attempts it will have to possess an additional share. For instance, if P0 were to solve
for (a0 ⇤ b1 ), it would need to acquire b1 from P1 . However, P0 already has b1 in it’s
ownership; acquiring the additional share, b1 , would allow for P0 to have ownership
over the complete secret as it now possessed all the shares required to reconstruct the
message. This defeats the sole purpose of Shamir’s Secret Sharing which prevents
any single party of having complete ownership over the data.
In order to solve this problem, two steps are required; masking and the presence of an additional party. Through masking, we are able to introduce a new unknown number to each party. This number will be eliminated once the shares are
combined. However, if either of the parties generate the unknown value, that would
violate the privacy-preserving component of the protocol as the party that is generating the unknown number will have knowledge of the value of the number. Thus,
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a third party is required to generate these unknown numbers which will be utilized
to hide the data the parties do not wish to disclose to one another. As a result, b1
is masked from P0 while a0 is masked from P1 . These masks are denoted as s and t
while the masked values are referred to as ↵ and
The multiplication of a * b performed by P0 becomes:

z0 = st0 + (s0 ⇤ ) + (↵ ⇤ t0 ) + (↵ ⇤ )

(4.4)

While the multiplication performed by P1 becomes:

z1 = st1 + (s1 ⇤ ) + (↵ ⇤ t1 )

(4.5)

At this point, a third party is needed to create some values for masking; We
denote this ”helper” as P2 . This party will generate three new values. The first
two values generated will be arbitrary while the third will be the product of the two
numbers. As an implementation, let us assume P2 choose random values of 7 and 11.
The third value will be 77. The table below reflects the shares all parties currently
own
P0

P1

P2

a0 = 3

a1 = 2

s=7

b0 = 9

b1 = -1

t = 11
st = 77

At this point, the P2 values will be split into shares.
s

t

s0 = 4

t0 = 5

s1 = 3

t1 = 6
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The way these values are used is that it is subtracted from the original data
as follows

↵ = (a0

s0 ) + (a1

s1 )

(4.6)

= (b0

t0 ) + (b1

t1 )

(4.7)

Then, P2 will send s0 and t0 to P0 while it sends s1 and t1 to P1 . By the end
of this step, each party has the following
At this point, the three values will be split into shares.
P0

P1

a0 = 3

a1 = 2

b0 = 9

b1 = -1

s0 = 4

s1 = 3

t0 = 5

t1 = 6

Now, P0 can compute (a0
(b0

t0 ) for our

s0 ) in the equation for our ↵ value and compute

value while P1 can calculate the (a1

computations of the ↵ value and similarly compute (b1

s1 ) for the remaining

t1 ) for the

value.

So,
↵ = (a0

s0 ) + (a1

s1 ) = (3

4) + (2

3) =

2

(4.8)

5) + ( 1

6) =

3

(4.9)

while
= (b0

t0 ) + (b1

The values of ↵ and

t1 ) = (9

are -2 and -3 respectively. P0 and P1 now uses the

values to compute the final output. We revisit formulas 4.4 and 4.5 to calculate the
following
z0 = st0 + (s0 ⇤ ) + (↵ ⇤ t0 ) + (↵ ⇤ )

(4.10)
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z0 = 44 + (4 ⇤

3) + ( 2 ⇤ 5) + ( 2 ⇤

3)

z0 = 28
While the computation performed by P1 becomes:

z1 = st1 + (s1 ⇤ beta) + (alpha ⇤ t1 )

z1 = 33 + (3 ⇤

3) + ( 2 ⇤ 6)

z1 = 12

(4.11)

(4.12)

(4.13)

Finally, we combine the values after combining the shares to get:
z0 + z1 = 28 + 12 = 40
which is the product of the value of the original secret.

4.5. COMPARISON BETWEEN SHAMIR’S SECRET SHARING AND
HOMOMORPHIC BASED ENCRYPTION
4.5.1. Homomorphic Encryption.
1. Size: Homomorphic encryption has a larger computational overhead than plaintext operations. Also, homomorphic encryption based schemes requires to individually encrypt each input in it’s own cipher-text.
2. Computation: Public key encryption schemes are based on computationally
difficult problems and thus, require expensive operations such as modular exponentiation. It also makes it commercially infeasible for computationally-heavy
applications.
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4.5.2. Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme.
1. Size: This scheme creates n shares of each input, where each share is of the
same size as the secret.
2. Computation: the computations under this scheme consists of choosing a random polynomial and evaluating it in n points. When seeing this computation
graphically, the polynomial is chosen along the same function of graph of the
secret itself; this means that usually all computations are done with ordinary
integers [15].
One of the greatest advantages of Shamir’s Secret Sharing is that the individual
shards or pieces can be dynamically added or deleted without a↵ecting the other
pieces. It is also dynamic as security can be easily enhanced without changing the
secret; this is done by simply changing the polynomial and constructing new shares
to the participants. It is also flexible as it can be organized based on hierarchy; we
can supply each participant di↵erent number of pieces according to their importance
inside the organization [15].
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5. PROPOSED F SF R PROTOCOL

The protocol we propose requires a number of communications between our
three parties: C1 , C2 and the OSNP. The steps of F SF R1 and F SF R2 are defined in
this section. Before the communications among the OSNP and cloud servers begin,
the user’s friend-lists from the matrix must be split and outsourced as shown in Fig.
5.1.

5.1. F SF R1
1. All parties know n users
• In this model, we use 2 Cloud Servers as well as an OSNP; all three parties
know the users that are selected.
• Each user will split their matrices and send them to C1 , C2 and the OSNP.
(we do not encrypt them as done in PAFR protocol)
• All parties will now have their respective shares.
2. The OSNP wants to make friend recommendations for n-users. It then picks
shares of corresponding matrices of those n users (their unique IDs) and sends
it to C2
• C2 and C1 agree on a permutation that is only known to themselves exclusively.
3. C2 will add those shares with its own corresponding shares
4. Now, C1 and C2 will separately permute those matrices shares and send them
to the OSNP.
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Figure 5.1: Users outsourcing data

Figure 5.2: Sending matrix shares to the parties
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Figure 5.3: Permutation on shares from the OSNP

• C2 and C1 apply a permutation to the share they receive from the OSNP
and sends them separately/individually to the OSNP. We refer to the
permutation function as ⇡1 .
• The permutation value is added to each entry in the first column of the
matrices to prevent the OSNP from obtaining information on the correspondence of friend-lists.
5. The OSNP reconstructs the matrices and identifies the permuted friend-lists.
• In this step, the OSNP will know the matrices and friend-lists but in its
permuted form.
6. The OSNP permutes the lists again and sends them back to both C1 and C2 .
• Each list will consist of users and the aggregated matrices
7. C1 and C2 will separately add the shares of the corresponding matrices locally.
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• Both C1 and C2 will know that the friend-list belongs to some users (permuted n-lists)
8. C1 will take all the users in the friend-lists and add their matrices/combine
them then send its aggregated shares to C2 .
9. C2 combines them with its own aggregated shares and send it to the OSNP.
• C1 and C2 will now have one aggregated matrix.
10. The OSNP does inverse permutation, combines them with its own shares (now
possessing all of the shares) and checks the frequencies in the final matrix.
• The OSNP decrypts the second columns and checks whether the common neighbors score frequency is greater than or equal to t. If it is, the
corresponding randomized ID will be added to the new friend-list.
• The OSNP now knows the permuted new friend-lists for n users but it
does not know which friend-list corresponding to which user due to the
permutation.
11. The OSNP sends the list to C1 .
• Each ID is split among the parties (C1 and C2 ). C1 and C2 cannot collude.
12. C1 inversely permutes the list to obtain the correct order of the randomized
new friend-lists.
• Now, C1 has the correct order of the new friend-list; however it is in it’s
randomized form.
13. We want to get the friend-list non-randomized AND in correct order.
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Figure 5.4: OSNP permutation and frequency computation

A second solution was developed utilizing a hybrid approach of the combination of Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme with Paillier’s encryption and utilizes random
numbers. The Paillier cryptosystem is advantageous as it provides fast encryption
and decryption algorithms.
Random numbers are used to inject unpredictability or non-deterministic data
to make the resulting data virtually unguessable. In this case, we encrypt the random
values with the friend-lists. The goal of this modified solution is to allow C2 to be
able to receive the random numbers in the order of the OSNP’s permutation function.

5.2. F SF R2
1. All parties know n users
• In this model, we use 2 Cloud Servers as well as an OSNP; all three parties
know the users that are selected.
• Each user will split their matrices and send them to C1 , C2 and the OSNP.
(we do not encrypt them as done in PAFR protocol)
• All parties will now have their respective shares.
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Figure 5.5: F SF R2
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2. The OSNP wants to make friend recommendations for n-users. It then picks
shares of corresponding matrices of those n users (their unique IDs) and sends
it to C2
• C2 and C1 agree on a permutation that is only known to them exclusively.
3. C2 will add those shares with its own corresponding shares
4. Now, C1 and C2 will separately permute those matrices shares and send them
to the OSNP.
• C2 and C1 apply a permutation to the share they receive from the OSNP
and sends them separately/individually to the OSNP. We refer to the
permutation function as ⇡1 .
• The permutation value is added to each entry in the first column of the
matrices to prevent the OSNP from obtaining information on the correspondence friend-lists.
5. The OSNP reconstructs the matrices and identifies the permuted friend-lists.
• In this step, the OSNP will know the matrix and friend-lists but in its
permuted form.
6. The OSNP permutes the lists again and sends them back to both C1 and C2 .
• Each list will consist of users and the aggregated matrices
7. C1 and C2 will separately add the shares of the corresponding matrices locally.
• Both C1 and C2 will know that the friend-list belongs to some users (permuted n-lists)
8. C1 will take all the users in the friend-lists and add their matrices/combine
them then send its aggregated shares to C2 .
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9. C2 combines them with its own aggregated shares and encrypts negative values
of random numbers in some order using its own Paillier’s public key and sends
them to the OSNP. Paillier’s scheme are known for their efficiency; they also
allow to achieve the highest security level for homomorphic encryption schemes.
• We encrypt using C2 ’s public key rather than the OSNP’s because our
final destination is C2 ; we want C2 to receive the values in proper order by
the end. If our final goal was for the OSNP to receive the values in proper
order, we would encrypt using the OSNP’s public key. However, C2 cannot
let the OSNP know the value of R. Thus, we encrypt it as described.
10. The OSNP does inverse permutation and combines them with its own shares
and checks the frequencies in the final matrix before sending it to C1 .
• The OSNP now has the encrypted permuted and randomized new friendlist; it also has the encrypted random numbers in correct order.
11. C1 performs an inverse permutation on the encrypted list, re-randomizes it and
sends the result to the OSNP.
• C1 now knows the randomized friend-list
• After this step, the OSNP will not be able to compare the friend-list or
encounter any information leakage due to the re-randomization that took
place in previous step –the OSNP now has the encrypted random numbers
with the randomized list.
12. The OSNP will randomly split the encrypted values into shares
• The OSNP adds new random numbers (R) and send the results to C2
• C2 decrypts the values and gets its share (L2) while OSNP retrieves it’s
own share (L3).
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• C2 decrypts with the private key that is known only to itself
• L2 + L3 = negative value of the random numbers (what C2 encrypted)
13. C2 decrypts and gets the random numbers in correct order.
14. Three parties will send their shares individually to the user.

5.3. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our protocol was able to eliminate one crucial information leakage through
developing F SF R2 . However, we were unable to successfully eliminate a a case
of information leakage in Step 5 and Step 6, although is arguably less significant.
In Step 5 of F SF R1 , the OSNP is able to identify the friend-lists in its permuted
form. Although it is in its permuted form, there is still information leakage taking
place as the OSNP can identify the permuted friend-list. Likewise, in Step 6, the
permuted friend-list is being vulnerable to leakage once it is sent to C1 and C2 . In Step
10, once the OSNP performs inverse permutation and combines the shares received
from C2 (which has previously been combined with shares from C1 ), the permuted
friend-list will be exposed and susceptible to information leakage once again. In all
three instances, there is a possibility of user privacy being jeopardized. However,
the potential leakage in Step 10 was able to be eliminated through the utilization of
random values in our modified solution, F SF R2 . The reason we were only able to
eliminate the weakness in Step 10 is that we could add random numbers only because
no computations needed to be performed involving the contents of the friend-list.
However, in Step 5 and 6, the cloud needs to know which matrices to choose to begin
computing the common neighbor score. It can not randomly choose the matrices;
thus, we could not add a random value to it. Future research on eliminating the
leakages in Step 5 and 6 could strengthen the privacy-preserving component of the
protocol.
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6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

P P F Rh provides a strong security guarantee and utilizes a universal hash
function for improving the efficiency. However, this efficiency comes at the expense
of degraded accuracy due to the involved hash collisions. On the other hand, the second method utilizes the concept of protecting the source privacy through anonymous
message routing and recommends friends accurately. Both of the proposed protocols
preserve the privacy of each user. Nonetheless, both protocols leak di↵erent additional information. While the hashing and random permutation prevents the third
party from identifying the actual source of the scores, the P P F Rh protocol leaks the
common neighbors scores to a third party while the P P F Rsp protocol reveals the
common neighbors scores which are more than the threshold to user A. This may
allow a significant amount of information to be deduced. However, since the protocol
guarantees the source privacy, A cannot determine the sources corresponding to the
scores.

Our protocol protects the friend-lists and user profiles from being leaked to any
party in a secure and efficient manner. In addition, we do not utilize any expensive
computations other than encrypting the random values with Paillier’s encryption for
F SF R2 . Moreover, computations can be performed conveniently while preserving
the privacy of all the shards that make up the secret as Shamir’s Secret Sharing
scheme allows for computations to be performed of split shares.
The table below reflects some key di↵erences among the protocols discussed
in this thesis.
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Table 6.1: Protocol Comparison: P P F Rh , P P F Rsp , P AF R, F SF R1 and F SF R2
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7. CONCLUSION

7.1. SUMMARY
Due to increased participation and growth of Online Social Networks, many
people are concerned about their privacy and how well it is being preserved. People
want to interact freely with other users without having to worry about their privacy
being jeopardized; they want to be guaranteed that their information is kept private
and undisclosed to anyone, including any third party. This proves to be a challenge as
user information is needed to compute di↵erent types of data on OSN. A key example
of this is the friend recommendation feature.
While users are capable of manually creating friendships with other users by
going to the profile of the user they wish to befriend, social media platforms like
Twitter, Instagram and Facebook utilize an e↵ective ”automatic” feature known as
friend recommendation. Although this seems automatic and may be perceived to be
random, it is far from being an arbitrary procedure. Friend recommendations on an
OSN is carried out through the implementations of protocols and algorithms in a
measured and detailed manner. Several protocols exist to allow for the implementations of friend recommendations. Nonetheless, due to one reason or another, they
fail to meet stringent user-privacy standards. This calls for the need to develop more
secure and efficient friend recommendation protocols which this thesis develops and
elaborates on.
We refer to three existing friend recommendation protocols known as P P F Rh ,
P P F Rsp and P AF R and identified weaknesses with each protocol. We were able
to successfully eliminate a number of key weaknesses while increasing efficiency and
strengthening the privacy-preserving components through developing the F SF R pro-
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tocol. Our protocol adopts a Federated cloud environment which coordinates with an
OSNP to carry out computations on shares in a cooperative manner using Shamir’s
Secret Sharing scheme. By incorporating a collaboration of an OSNP with multiple public cloud environments, our protocol sees more balanced and comparatively
equally distributed computation across the parties.We also performed a comparative
analysis between the protocols and scrutinized their security implications, efficiency,
performance, cost and more.

7.2. FUTURE WORK
As we have yet to actually implement the FSFR protocol, future research could
focus on the execution of the friend recommendation protocol through adopting the
F SF R protocol. The resulting performance details would yield more accurate results.
In Section 5, we discuss the information leakages that may take place in Step 5 and 6.
Developing a method to prevent these leakages would help make the protocol more
secure. Another direction of research could be based on developing protocols that
utilizes users content based algorithms to recommend friends to users using Shamir’s
Secret Sharing scheme. Under such a framework, an algorithm that considers users’
hobbies, education and age will be required. Another direction that can be pursued to
expand this research is to develop a Secret Sharing based protocol that does not rely
on any form of encryption whatsoever. Although our protocol relies fundamentally
on Shamir’s Secret Sharing, F SF R2 adopts a hybrid framework This would require
to discover a way to allow the secret shares to be received in it’s original order.
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